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ENFORCEABILITY OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LIENS AND
PREVENTION OF DOUBLE
RECOVERY - NEW
DIMENSIONS
Thomas Pace*

As a matter of first impression, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently held in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Districtof Columbia' that
an employer or its subrogated insurer2 having made workmen's compensation payments to an employee must formally intervene in that employee's
suit against a third party for the work-related injury in order to assert a
lien for reimbursement from any recovery proceeds. Absent such intervention, the third party, including one having notice of the employer's recoupment interest, can pay recovery proceeds to the injured employee without
any resultant liability to the employer. 3 Moreover, in a related case now
pending before the court of appeals, Travelers Insurance Co. v. Jones,4 a
superior court judge held that, absent such intervention by the employer,
recoupment of workmen's compensation payments by the employer from
either the employee or the employee's attorney is also barred.'
Both decisions illustrate the current state of workmen's compensation
* Associate, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D.C.; A.B., University of North Carolina, 1973; J.D., Washington and Lee University, 1976. The author wishes
to thank the firm of Carr, Jordan, Coyne & Savits for its support to the author while associated with that firm in the preparation of this article and further wishes to thank Mr. James
D. Healy for assistance rendered in research for this article.
1. 382 A.2d 269 (D.C. 1978).
2. When the insurer makes payment on behalf of the employer, the insurer is subrogated to all rights of the employer under § 933(h) of the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976).
3. 382 A.2d at 270, 274.
4. Nos. 227-76 & 2357-76 (D.C. Super. Ct.), appeals docketed, Nos. 13660 & 13661
(D.C. June 8, 1978).
5. Record at 8-9, 18, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Jones, Nos. 227-76, & 2357-76 (D.C. Super.
Ct. June 2, 1978). The Jones decision also raises questions about the requirement for an
employer's written consent under the Act to make an employee's settlement with a third
party effective. See text accompanying notes 94-127 infra.
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law in the District of Columbia. As such, they raise numerous questions
about the presently ill-defined relationships and duties attaching to employees, employers, third parties, and attorneys representing employees
under current workmen's compensation law' and suggest areas meriting
exploration under the proposed District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act of 1979. 7
I.

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF EMPLOYEE, EMPLOYER, THIRD
PARTY, AND EMPLOYEE'S ATTORNEY

Since 1928, private employees 8 in the District of Columbia injured in
the course of employment have been protected by the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 9 as applied to the District.' ° The
benefits secured under the Act seek to compensate the injured employee
regardless of fault." As consideration for foregoing these defenses and in
6. See text accompanying notes 8-27 infra.
7. Bill 3-106, 25 D.C. Reg. 8524-89 (March 14, 1979); see text accompanying notes
128-30 infra.
8. Non-government, or private, employees in the District of Columbia, surprisingly,
comprise the largest group of employees covered by the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976). See 2A A. LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 76.43, at 176 (Supp. 1978). The Act was originally passed by Congress to
provide workmen's compensation coverage for longshoremen and harbor workers such as
ship repairmen and shipbuilders. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-902 (1976). Pursuant to its legislative power over the District of Columbia, Congress later extended the Act to cover, with
certain exceptions, all employees of the private sector employed in the District. See D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 36-501 to 502 (1973). As might be expected, confusion sometimes results
from the application of harbor-related terminology to the more normal working environs in
the District. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976) (refers to the exclusive liability under the
Act of the stevedore (employer) and to the stevedore's non-liability to the vessel (third party)
under either contract or tort theory). The question may arise whether the exclusive and nonliability provisions apply equally to the parallel relationships in the private sector in the
District. See, e.g., McNeary v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 5895-74 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 8,
1975). There is no equivalent to § 905(b) in the proposed District of Columbia Workers'
Compensation Act of 1979 which may erode the District employer's exclusive liability. See
note 13 infra.
Persons employed by the United States and the District of Columbia are provided workmen's compensation coverage under separate acts which will not be discussed except as relevant to discussion of the Act. See Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 81018193 (1976) (United States employees); District of Columbia Government Comprehensive
Merit Personnel Act, Law 2-139, §§ 2301-2346, 25 D.C. Reg. 5740 (Supp. 1 1978) (effective
March 3, 1979) (District of Columbia employees).
9. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976); see note 8 supra.
10. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-501 to 502 (1973); see note 8 supra.
II. The Act provides that compensation shall be payable unless "the injury was occasioned solely by the intoxication of the employee or by the willful intention of the employee
to injure or kill himself or another." 33 U.S.C. § 903(b) (1976). The proposed Act of 1979
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the interest of promoting compensation for injured employees, the Act releases the employer from any further liability to the employee 2 or a third
party. 13
The Act, however, permits, if not encourages, the employee to sue any
third party responsible for the work-related injury. As a result of the 1959
amendments to section 933(a) of the Act,' 4 the employee no longer must
contains identical language. Bill 3-106, § 4(d), 25 D.C. Reg. 8531 (March 14, 1979). Thus,
for the employer, "the three wicked sisters of the common law-contributory negligence,
assumption of risk and the fellow servant rule-are abolished as defenses." W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 (4th ed. 1971). The procedures for filing and pursuing a claim
under the Act are administrative in nature under the Employment Standards Administration of the United States Department of Labor as set forth in 33 U.S.C. §§ 913, 914, 921
(1976); 20 C.F.R. §§ 702.201-.422 (1978). Under the proposed Act of 1979, the Mayor's
office will assume the administrative role of the Department of Labor. See Bill 3-106, § 21,
25 D.C. Reg. 8563-65 (March 14, 1979).
12. 33 U.S.C. §§ 905(a), 933(i) (1976). If the employer fails, however, pursuant to §§
932(a)(1) and (2), to secure coverage with an insurance carrier or to qualify as self-insured,
then the injured employee may either recover against the employer through the normal administrative procedures under the Act, see note I1 supra, or sue the employer, who may not
raise the defenses of fellow servant, assumption of risk, or contributory negligence. 33
U.S.C. § 905(a) (1976); accord, Howard v. Lightner, 214 A.2d 474, 476 (D.C. 1965). In
addition, an employer who fails to comply with subsections 932(a)(1) or (2) risks imprisonment of not more than one year, or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both. 33 U.S.C. §
938(a) (1976). Identical penalties are proposed in the Act of 1979. See Bill 3-106, § 39(a), 25
D.C. Reg. 8584 (March 14, 1979).
13. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1976) specifically prohibits such third parties as a spouse, parents, next of kin, or any legal representative of the employee from recovering more against
the employer than provided by the Act. Under the Act, such persons only become entitled
to benefits when the employee dies. See 33 U.S.C. § 909 (1976).
In addition, consistent with the employer's non-liability to third parties, courts have long
recognized that a third party wrongdoer cannot seek common law contribution from an
employer alleged to have been concurrently negligent in causing the employee's injury. See
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952); Murray v.
United States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Various schemes developed circumventing
the prohibition against contribution or indemnification. See, e.g., Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
Pan-Atlantic S.S. Co., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). The 1972 amendments to the Act, however, were
intended to preclude any such recovery under tort or contract theory. See 33 U.S.C. §
905(b) (1976). The effectiveness of the amendments to preclude indemnification and contribution from the employer and the ability of the third party wrongdoer to reduce the amount
of the employee's judgment against the third party, where the employee is concurrently negligent, remain open to question. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 8, at § 76.43. Compare
Dawson v. Contractors Transp. Corp., 467 F.2d 727, 729 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1972) with Turner v.
Excavation Constr., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 704 (D.D.C. 1971). Of interest is the recently proposed District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act of 1979 which fails to provide any
equivalent to § 905(b). Thus, if that Act passes as presently worded, indemnification and
contribution demands by third parties may once again confront employers now arguably
protected by § 905(b).
14. 33 U.S.C. § 933(a) (1976) provides:
If on account of a disability or death for which compensation is payable under
this chapter the person entitled to such compensation determines that some person
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choose between receiving workmen's compensation benefits or recovering
damages from a third party. 5 Accordingly, the employee may receive
both workmen's compensation benefits and seek damages from the responsible third party. 6 Under section 933(b), 7 however, unless the employee
files suit against the third party within six months of a workmen's compensation award, all the employee's rights to sue the third party are assigned
to the employer.
As an assignee under the Act, the employer may either sue to recover
damages against the third party or may compromise with the third party
with or without filing suit.'" Pursuant to section 933(e),' 9 whatever recovery the employer realizes is distributed first to reimburse the employer for
its litigation expenses and for all workmen's compensation benefits paid to
the employee, with any excess, less one-fifth, then distributed to the employee.
The Act, however, fails to provide a distributive scheme when the employee, pursuant to section 933(b), recovers damages from the third party.
To forestall double recovery by the employee and to protect the employer,
courts have consistently held that the distributive scheme in section 933(e)
applies, whether the proceeds result from a suit by either the employer or
employee.2 ° Such reasoning comports with the Act's policy of protecting
other than the employer or a person or persons in his employ is liable for damages,
he need not elect whether to receive such compensation or to recover damages
against such third person.
15. See Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Wynn, 343 F.2d 295, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Ashcraft
& Gerel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 343 F.2d 333, 336 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
16. Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Wynn, 343 F.2d 295, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
17. 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1976) provides in relevant part:
Acceptance of such compensation under an award in a compensation order...
shall operate as an assignment to the employer of all right of the person entitled to
compensation to recover damages against such third person unless such person
shall commence an action against such third person within six months after such
award.
18. 33 U.S.C. § 933(d) (1976).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 933(e) (1976) provides, in relevant part:
Any amount recovered by such employer on account of such assignment,
whether or not as the result of a compromise, shall be distributed as follows:
(I) The employer shall retain an amount equal to(A) the expenses incurred by him in respect to such proceedings or compromise (including a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the deputy commissioner or Board);
(B) the cost of all benefits actually furnished by him to the employee under
section 907 of this title;
(C) all amounts paid as compensation; ..
(2) The employer shall pay any excess to the person entitled to compensation
• . . less one-fifth of such excess which shall belong to the employer.
20. See, e.g., Nacirema Operating Co. v. Oosting, 456 F.2d 956, 958 n.3 (4th Cir.), cert.
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the employer who foregoes the normal defenses to an employee's action
and who is absolutely liable to an injured employee. 2' The Act thus fully
reimburses the employer, furnishing a quidpro quo for accepting absolute
avoiding the inflaliability. 22 The Act further protects the employer by 23
tionary impact of rising compensation insurance costs.
The employer's right to full reimbursement has usually been characterized as a "lien" interest in the third party recovery proceeds. 24 In the
evolution of third party actions, courts generally "have permitted the employer or its insurer to intervene in the employee's suit to protect its right"
of first payment for its lien under the distributive scheme.25 In no case
denied, 409 U.S. 980 (1972); Mitchell v. Etna, 138 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1943); Fontana v. Pennsylvania R.R., 106 F. Supp. 461, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), affdmem. sub nom. Fontana v. Grace
Line, Inc., 205 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 886 (1953). See also Potomac Elec.
Power Co. v. Wynn, 343 F.2d 295, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (employer's interest in recoupment
protected by a lien in the third party proceeds). In Ashcraft & Gerel v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 343 F.2d 333, 336-37 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the court stated that the 1959 amendments did
not alter the distributive scheme, requiring first reimbursement to the employer even when
the employee brought the suit. The court left unresolved, however, the issue of whether the
employer's right of reimbursement would still prevail in situations in which the recovery did
not exceed the employer's recoupment interest. Subsequent decisions elsewhere, however,
clearly indicate that -the employer is to be fully reimbursed first, even if the employee receives nothing. See, e.g., Valentino v. Rickners Rhederei, G.M.B.H., SS Etha, 552 F.2d 466,
468 n.2, 470 n.5 (2d Cir. 1977).
21. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 412 (1953); Louviere v. Shell
Oil Co., 509 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976) (both stating
that a recognized purpose of the Act is "to protect employers who are subjected to absolute
liability by the Act.").
22. See Ashcraft & Gerel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 343 F.2d 333, 336 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
("full reimbursement of the employer.., is an important object of congressional policy.").
See generally cases cited in notes 20 & 21 supra.
23. See Granger v. Urda, 44 N.Y.2d 91, 93, 375 N.E.2d 380, 382, 404 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321
(1978). District of Columbia courts have long recognized the persuasive authority of New
York workmen's compensation decisions when interpreting the District's workmen's compensation law and its underlying policies. See Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220, 222-23
(D.C. Cir.), cert.denied, 354 U.S. 914 (1957); Wynn v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 875, 878 (D.D.C.
1963), affd sub nom. Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Wynn, 343 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
24. See, e.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Wynn, 343 F.2d 295, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
("[t]he employer's interest in recoupment, if the employee ultimately succeeds in recovering
from the third party, would presumably be protected by a hen on the proceeds."); accord,
Albert v. Paulo, 552 F.2d 1139, 1141 n.3 (5th Cir. 1977); Valentino v. Rickners Rhederei,
G.M.B.H., SS Etha, 552 F.2d 466, 467 n.l (2d Cir. 1977); Celia v. Partenreederi MS Ravenna, 529 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975 (1976); Landon v. Lief
Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756, 760-61 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976);
Nacirema Operating Co. v. Oosting, 456 F.2d 956, 958 n.3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
980 (1972); Fontana v. Pennsylvania R.R., 106 F. Supp. 461, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), a fdmem.
sub nom. Fontana v. Grace Line, Inc., 205 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 886
(1953).
25. Travelers Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia, 382 A.2d 269, 271 (D.C. 1978) (quoting
Allen v. Texaco, Inc., 510 F.2d 977, 979-80 (5th Cir. 1975)) (emphasis added).
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prior to Travelers Insurance Co. v. District of Columbia, however, did a
court state that the employer must intervene to enforce that lien against the
third party;2 6 nor did any court, as in the subsequent case Travelers Insurance Co. v. Jones, hold that absent such intervention the employer could
proceeds payments from the employee or the
not recover its third2 party
7
attorney.
employee's
II.

THE

District of Columbia DECISION

The same facts underlie both the District of Columbia and Jones decisions. In March, 1973, Jones, an employee of the Southland Corporation,
was injured while making a delivery for his employer to a District of Columbia public school. 2' Travelers, as the workmen's compensation carrier
for Southland, paid Jones' workmen's compensation benefits in the
amount of $4,254.7629 without a formal award.3" In May and June of
1973, Travelers 3 ' twice by letter notified both Jones and his attorney of its
workmen's compensation lien interest in any recovery against the District.3 z

Subsequently, in July, 1973, Jones filed a personal injury action against
the District for the latter's alleged negligence causing his injury.3 3 Mrs.
Jones filed a joint claim for loss of consortium. 34 By way of Mr. Jones'
answers to interrogatories, the District admittedly learned of Travelers'
workmen's compensation payments to him.35
26. See text accompanying notes 59-72 infra.
27. See text accompanying notes 104-23 infra.
28. 382 A.2d at 270.
29. Id
30. The procedures for filing a claim for benefits leading to entry of a formal award
after a hearing before a federal administrative law judge are set forth in 33 U.S.C. §§ 913 &
919 (1976). See note II supra (procedure under the Act and the proposed Act of 1979).
Formal award procedures were rendered unnecessary by Travelers' voluntary and prompt
payment to Mr. Jones.
31. Under the Act, upon payment on behalf of the employer, an insurance carrier is
subrogated to all rights and interests of the employer. 33 U.S.C. § 933(h) (1976); see Travelers Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia, 382 A.2d at 269 & 270 n. I.
32. Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Jones, appeals docketed, Nos. 13660,
13661 (D.C. June 29, 1978).
33. 382 A.2d at 270. As stated previously, the injured employee may file suit against a
third party within six months of a formal award. 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1976); see text accompanying notes 14-17 supra. Because Jones' suit was timely filed, Travelers was precluded
from bringing an action as assignee against the District of Columbia. See 33 U.S.C. § 933(b)
(1976).
34. See Brief for Appellant at 7, Travelers Inc. Co. v. Jones, appeals docketed, Nos.
13660, 13661 (D.C. June 28, 1978).
35. Record at 2, Travelers Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia, No. 227-76 (D.C. Super. Ct.
March 10, 1976).
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In February, 1974, the District settled the lawsuit without Travelers'
written approval and without regard to Travelers' lien interest.3 6 According to the terms of the settlement, Mr. Jones received $1,500 while Mrs.
Jones, for her loss of consortium claim, received $2,000. 3 7 Both before and
after settlement, communications allegedly occurred between the Jones' attorney and Travelers in which the Jones' attorney agreed to protect Travelers' lien in the settlement proceeds.3 " In any event, Travelers received
none of the settlement proceeds from any party or representative and subsequently filed suit against the District of Columbia and Mr. Jones for
failure to protect its lien.
In TravelersInsuranceCo. v. Districtof Columbia, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals considered, as a matter of first impression, the validity of Travelers' lien claim against the District. Travelers contended that
since the District knew of its payments to Mr. Jones before settlement, the
city had notice of Travelers lien interest in any settlement proceeds. 39 Accordingly, Travelers viewed the District's failure to make its first payment
to the insurance company as a failure to honor that lien, thereby rendering
the city liable to Travelers in the amount of the $1,500 settlement to Mr.
Jones.4 °

In response, the District contended that section 933(b) of the Act, assigning the employee's rights against third parties to the employer only if
the employee does not file timely suit,4 limited the extent of Travelers'
rights. Thus, the District argued, since Mr. Jones filed suit within the Act's
time limitation, Travelers had no substantive rights against the District
and could only recover "against the employee if the employee succeeds in
his third party action. '"42
36. 33 U.S.C. § 933(g) (1976) requires the written approval of the employer and the
insurance carrier for a settlement to be effective. See text accompanying note 98 infra.
37. Record at 13-14, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Jones, appeals docketed, Nos. 13660, 13661

(D.C. June 29, 1978).
38. Brief for Appellant at 7-8, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Jones, appeals docketed, Nos. 13660,
13661 (D.C. June 29, 1978).

39. 382 A.2d at 270.
40. Id The full amount of Travelers' lien interest was $4,254.76, the amount paid by it
to Mr. Jones. See text accompanying note 29 supra. However, the lien interest, if extant,
attached only to the $1,500 settlement proceeds intended for Mr. Jones. The remaining
$2,000 for Mrs. Jones could not be pursued by Travelers since she was not paid workmen's
compensation benefits for which recoupment might be sought. The strategy to avoid the
carrier's recoupment interest in Mr. Jones' recovery by paying more to Mrs. Jones is obvious. However, in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Jones, Travelers sued the District for the difference
between the $1,500 and $4,254.76 under a different subrogation theory. See note 109 and
accompanying text infra.
41. The relevant provisions of 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1976) are set forth in note 17 supra.
42. 328 A.2d at 271-72. As a corollary, the District argued that since Travelers was the
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Although finding that, under the circumstances, section 933(b) precluded any statutorily created action by Travelers as assignee against the
District,4 3 the court of appeals agreed with Travelers' contention that prior
law' permitted an employer to file a nonstatutory cause of action directly
against a third party.45 The court recognized, however, that an employer's
nonstatutory cause of action must nevertheless arise from an "independent
wrong" committed against the employer by the third party.46
Having disposed of that issue, the court considered whether the District
had committed an independent wrong by failing to honor the equitable
lien arising from Travelers' compensation payments to Jones.47 The court
subrogee of Mr. Jones and since he received the settlement proceeds, Mr. Jones, and therefore Travelers had no further substantive rights against the District. Brief for Appellee at 46, Travelers Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia, 382 A.2d 269 (D.C. 1978). The court's recognition of an employer's independent cause of action rendered that argument meritless. See
text accompanying notes 43-46 infra.
43. 382 A.2d at 271. The court recognized that, under § 933(b), once the employee filed
suit within six months, the employer could not, as the employee's assignee, file suit. Id. at
270-71.
44. See Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404 (1969).
In Burnside, the employer filed a counterclaim for damages based upon workmen's compensation payments made to its injured employee against the third party who filed an action for
indemnification against the employer in the event the employee successfully prevailed in his
third party suit. The third party contended that § 933(b) permitted no separate cause of
action by the employer absent the employee's failure to file suit within the six month period
described in § 933(b). The Supreme Court found no reason to deny such a claim for damages based upon compensation paid by the employer against the third party where the third
party breached an independent duty owed to the employer. 394 U.S. at 414-15.
45. In so doing, the court indicated its disagreement with the decision in Joyner v. F&B
Enterprises, Inc., 448 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1971), to the extent that decision held an employer had no cause of action against a third party. 382 A.2d at 271-72. In addition, the
court noted the Joyner decision was not binding upon the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals under the court reorganization act (District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act
of 1970, Pub. L. 91-358 [codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.]) because it was rendered
subsequent to February 1, 1971. Id at 272. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.
1971) (decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals after February, 1971, are no
longer subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals).
46. 382 A.2d at 271, (quoting Federal Marine Terminals Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co.,
394 U.S. 404, 414-15 (1969)). In the lower court, the District also argued that absent a
formal award to the employee under § 933(b), no employer cause of action could exist. See
Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Travelers Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia, 382 A.2d 269 (D.C.
1978). The court of appeals rejected this contention, referring to Louviere v. Shell Oil Co.,
509 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976), which indicated that voluntary and prompt payment by the employer was to be encouraged. The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals recognized that to predicate an employer's non-statutory rights upon a
formal award would contravene the Act's purpose to secure prompt and voluntary payment.
382 A.2d at 272-73. In addition, an obvious contradiction would exist if, in recognizing the
nonexclusivity of § 933(b), the court imposed the subsection's limiting language upon nonstatutory causes of action.
47. 382 A.2d at 273.
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first recognized that substantial authority48 justified finding an equitable
lien in favor of the employer or its insurance carrier on the proceeds of an
employee's recovery.4 9 However, the court distinguished between liens
imposed on proceeds in the employee's possession and those in the possession of a third party. The court noted that such equitable liens are normally imposed upon the proceeds in the employee's possession.5" In those
instances where liens have been enforced against property in the third
party's possession, the court stated, without explanation, that the lien claim
had been "affirmatively asserted in the settlement proceedings or litigation
prior to the payment of the proceeds to the employee."'" Therefore, the
court refused to impose a lien on the proceeds in the District's possession
because Travelers knew of Jones' suit and failed to assert its lien interest
affirmatively in the settlement or litigation proceeding prior to payment.
precluded any justification for its failure
Apparently, Travelers' knowledge
52
to assert its lien interest.
The court also decided that in cases such as Districtof Columbia-where
a third party suit was pending-the only acceptable affirmative assertion of
a lien against proceeds in a third party's possession was the employer's
formal intervention.53 The primary rationale was to protect the third party
from a second suit by the employee for wrongful payment.5 4 The court,
however, admitted that the ability to force the employer-intervenor to settlement in court also justified intervention.55
The court's analysis is subject to question because it ignores the underlying justifications for imposing a lien on proceeds from a third party recov48. Id at 273-74; see cases cited therein and note 23 supra.
49. 382 A.2d at 274.
50. Id The court's observation is critical to the analysis of the holding in TravelersIns.
Co. v. Jones that an employer must intervene to assert a lien on the proceeds in the employee's possession. See text accompanying notes 94-127 infra.
51. 382 A.2d at 274.
52. The court stated: "no lien claim was affirmatively asserted here by Travelers prior
to the payment of the asserted proceeds to the employee Jones, even though Travelers was
aware of Jones' suit. We find this distinction controlling in our disposition of the case
53. Specifically in support of requiring intervention, the court stated, "Only if Travelers
had intervened and affirmatively asserted a right to the settlement proceeds . . . could the
District be protected in paying Travelers." 382 A.2d at 274. The intervention required is
apparently that provided for by Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 24.
54. See note 53 supra.
55. 382 A.2d at 274 n.7. The court quoted rather remarkable language employed by the
lower court concerning its preference for applying settlement pressure on the employer to
accept less for its lien interest, stating: "it's rather difficult for [the trial court] to take a nonparty back in the chambers and crank up the 'sweat box' to get the case settled." Id (quoting Record at 12).
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ery: protection for the employer 56 and prevention of an employee's double
recovery.5 7 Accordingly, because proceeds will be distributed similarly re58
gardless of whether the suit is instituted by the employer or employee,
the lien should be effective against the proceeds in the third party's possession notwithstanding the employer's intervention in an employee's suit.
Although courts in the District have not previously addressed this argument directly, decisions in the District and elsewhere interpreting the Act
and similar laws support such a contention.
In a remarkably similar case decided before the District of Columbia
decision, a New York appellate court, in Jarka Corp. v. Fireman's Fund
Indemnity Co. ,9 squarely confronted the issue of whether intervention by
the employer in a pending third party action is required. As in District of
Columbia, the employer made compensation payments under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act without a formal
award. The employee then sued the third party allegedly responsible for
his injury. The employer notified the third party of the payments and its
desire for reimbursement before commencement of the employee's action.
The third party, however., settled the action and paid the entire proceeds to
the employee. The employer sued the third party for reimbursement.6 °
The court held that intervention was not essential to secure first payment
to the employer "so long as there was notice to the tort-feasor of the employer's advances."'', Although the employer had notified the third party
both of the payments and of its desire for reimbursement, 62 the court required only that the third party be notified of the payments for the em56. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 412 (1953); Louviere v. Shell
Oil Co., 509 F.2d 278, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1975), cer. denied,423 U.S. 1078 (197,6) (a recognized
purpose of the Act is "to protect employers who are subjected to absolute liability by the Act
Elec. Power Co. v. Wynn, 343 F.2d 295, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("[tlhe em. .");Potomac
.
ployer's interest in recoupment, if the employee ultimately succeeds in recovering from the
third party, would presumably be protected by a lien on the proceeds"); Ashcraft & Gerel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 343 F.2d 333, 336 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("full reimbursement of the employer ... is an important object of congressional policy").
57. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Oosting, 456 F.2d 956, 958 n.3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 980 (1972); Davillier v. Cavn Venezuelan Line, 407 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (E.D. La.
1976); see cases cited therein and in note 23 supra. The court failed to address the policies
favoring the employer, discussed in the text accompanying notes 61-63 infra.
58. See notes 19-23 and accompanying text supra.
59. 286 App. Div. 148, 142 N.Y.S.2d 369, appeal dismissed, 309 N.Y. 909, 131 N.E.2d
908 (1955). District of Columbia courts have recognized the persuasive authority of New
York decisions construing workmen's compensation law. See note 23 supra.
60. 286 App. Div. at 149, 142 N.Y.S.2d at 369-70.
61. 286 App. Div. at 149, 142 N.Y.S.2d at 370. The court cited earlier federal cases
recognizing the applicability of the § 933(e) distributive scheme even though the employee
brings suit. Id See note 19 supra.
62. 286 App. Div. at 149, 142 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
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ployer to prevail. 63 Thus, in District of Columbia, in which the District of
Columbia received actual notice of Travelers' payments through Mr.
Jones' answer to interrogatories,64 both equity and legal precedent argue
for a similar result.
More recent federal cases support this conclusion while recognizing the
employer's right to satisfy its lien interest from the third party without re6 5 for
quiring intervention. In Russo v. Flota Merconte Grancolombiana,
example, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York considered an employee's objections to an employer's right to first
payment from proceeds which the third party sought to deposit with the
court. The court rejected the employee's suggestion that the employer
must intervene. According to the court, requiring intervention when other
parties had notice of the lien "would sacrifice substance for form."66 Implicitly, the court recognized the well established existence of an employer's lien interest in the proceeds in any party's possession.67 As in
Jarka,the court intimated that so long as the third party had notice of the
employer's payments, and hence of its lien interest, equity dictated first
payment to the employer.
Russo was cited with approval by the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit in Cella v. PartenreedereiMS Ravenna,68 in which the
court stated that formal intervention is not required to protect the employer's lien. 69 The employer in that case sent notice of its lien to both the
third party and the employee. Apparently, the court deemed the notice
effective.7 ° Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Albert v. Paulo7 permitted an
employer to file a "notice of payment" without formal intervention to protect the lien. The court outlined no requisite procedure to enforce the lien
63. The request for reimbursement was not expressly mentioned as a requirement or a
factor in the decision. Id
64. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
65. 303 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In Russo, the employer's right to reimbursement seemed to be uncontested by the third party. Knowledge by the employee's attorney of
the employer's interest apparently was also sufficient to require the employee to permit the
proceeds to be paid first to the employer. Id at 1406.
66. Id
67. In support of its position that intervention was required, the court cited Ballwanz v.
Jarka Corp., 382 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), and Riddick v. Rederi A/B Fredrika, 271 F.
Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967), where the courts recognized imposition of the lien before distribution to the employee. Thus, the lien effectively arose on the proceeds in the third party's
possession.
68. 529 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975 (1976).
69. 529 F.2d at 19.
70. Id at 17, 19.
71. 552 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1977).
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but merely permitted the filing without requiring formal intervention.7 2
Although the case law recognizes that actual notice should obviate the
need for intervention, the kind of notice required to impose the duty on
third parties to protect the employer's lien remains uncertain. In those
cases in which the source of notice was identified, it was usually found to
be an employer's letter to the third party. 73 There was, however, no indication that the employer would be any less protected if the third party
received notice of the employer's interest from another source. Thus,
when the third party receives notice of the employer's payments to the
employee and thus of the employer's lien interest as in District of Columbia, the employee's answers to the third party's interrogatories will furnish
notice sufficient to place a duty on the third party to protect the employer.
Whether notice is received directly from the employer or arises from the
litigation with the employee, the third party clearly knows of the employer's interest.7 4
In the cases discussed above, the employer knew of the employee's suit
against the third party. In contrast to Districtof Columbia, however, intervention was not required. Despite precedent to the contrary, the District of
Columbia court offered two justifications, besides the notice issues, for requiring intervention: to free third parties, who pay the employer first,
from suits by employees, and to facilitate settlement by forcing the employer to accept less for its lien, thus terminating the employee's third
party suit more quickly.7 5
72. Id.at 1140.
73. See text accompanying notes 67-72 supra; 74-79 infra.
74. Similarly, since the lien is a creation of the courts as a matter of law in interpreting
the Act's policy favoring the employer who has compensated its injured employee, perhaps
no notice is required. See note 23 supra. In jurisdictions such as New York, where the lien
arises by statute, notice to the third party is not required to render the third party liable.
Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Ins. Co., 57 Misc. 2d 764, 766, 293 N.Y.S.2d 735, 738
(1968). Although under the Act, the lien is a common law creation, no justifiable distinction
can be made between it and the lien created by statute. The policy to protect the employer,

prevent double recovery, and lower costs of the compensation system supports the protection
of the lien interest however created.
Interestingly, the District of Columbia Merit Personnel Act, in providing a new compensation system for persons employed by the District, requires no notice to the third party for
reimbursement to the District and states: "No court, insurer, attorney or other person shall
pay or distribute to the beneficiary or his or her designee the proceeds of such suit or settlement without first satisfying or assuring satisfaction of the interest of the District of Columbia.
... District of Columbia Government Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act of 1978,
Law 2-139, § 2332, 25 D.C. Reg. 5740, 5982 (Supp. 1 1978) (effective March 3, 1979). However, whether by oversight or intention, the proposed District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act fails to incorporate any such provision. Instead the proposed Act follows the
exact wording of § 933 of the existing Act. See text accompanying notes 129-31 infra.
75. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
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As to the first matter, the court relied upon the 1959 amendment to the
Act which permits an injured employee to receive compensation benefits
and also to sue the third party if the suit is brought within six months after
a compensation award. 6 Without reference to other supporting authority,
the court concluded that, as a result of the amendment, the third party
could believe that only the employee had a cause of action against it under
the Act's provisions.7 7
This position, however, apparently contradicts controlling law in the
District. In Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Wynn, 78 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had previously considered the reverse situation. An employee failed to sue a third party until
after six months had elapsed following his compensation award. The third
party argued that, under the Act, because the employee failed to file suit
within six months, the right to file suit was completely assigned to the employer.7 9 Apparently, as in District of Columbia, the third party knew
that the Act gave the employer the right to sue. Thus, the third party
feared double recovery. The court of appeals accurately responded that
"[t]he statute is not designed to protect third parties."8 ° Furthermore, the
court stated that any fear of double recovery was alleviated by the lien
interest of the employer in any proceeds received by the employee, thus
avoiding the possibility of an employer's separate suit against the third
party.8 The employer's lien interest, as directly inferred in Wynn," was
76. See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
77. 382 A.2d at 274.
78. 343 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Since the Wynn decision antedates the operative
date of the court reorganization, it is controlling law in the District. See M.A.P. v. Ryan,
285 A.2d 310 (D.C. 1971).
79. 343 F.2d at 296.
80. Id at 298. The Act's purpose is to define and limit the rights and duties of the
employee and employer, and therefore, the third party is not an intended beneficiary of the
Act. See text accompanying notes 13-28 supra.
81. 343 F.2d at 298. Despite the apparent precedent laid down in the Wynn decision,
the Districtof Columbia court neither cited nor distinguished it in reaching its opposite result. Moreover, this deviation cannot be justified on the basis of the two considerations
enunciated in Wynn - namely that the Act was not designed to protect third parties, and
that the courts should protect against employees receiving double recovery. Notably, since
Jones was not entitled to full payment, the District could have no realistic fears of a second
suit by Jones for failure to make full payment to him.
82. Id The court stated:
A further important purpose of the statutory assignment is to 'safeguard' the employer's right of recoupment 'where a claimant [compensated employee] does not
pursue a good third party action. . . .' This purpose does not require us to penalize the employee if the employer-assignee declines to sue the third party. In effect,
the employer's declination amounts to a waiver of the protection afforded by the
statutory assignment. Moreover, the employer's interest in recoupment, if the em-
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paramount to the interest of the employee in the proceeds. This reasoning
comports with that of other courts which have noted the failure of the
Act's amendments to alter the existing court-imposed distributive scheme
in favor of the employer's lien even when the employee files the third party
83
suit.
Similarly, the District of Columbia court's attempt to force an employer
to accept less for his lien by requiring intervention and then applying settlement pressure84 conflicts with other court decisions. Interestingly, once
again the court of appeals cited no case or statutory authority to support its
position. 85 The court, however, obviously hoped to settle third party actions more quickly by forcing employers, through persuasion by the trial
judge, to accept less for their lien interests, thereby permitting a larger recovery for the employee out of the settlement with the third party. The
employee would thus more readily accept a given offer of settlement if less
of it were owed to the employer.86
Although the district courts had not expressly considered the matter previously, the Second Circuit in Landon v. LiefHoegh & Co.,87 rebuffed a
similar argument. In Landon, the argument was raised that unless an employer's lien was subject to the defense of the employer's contributory negligence, it would be more difficult to force the employer to settle his lien
claim for a lesser amount. The Second Circuit recognized some practicality of the argument but nevertheless reasoned that many considerations
required congressional action to implement such a policy.8 8 Although the
ployee ultimately succeeds in recovering from the third party, would presumably
be protected by a lien on the proceeds ....
Id (footnotes omitted).
83. See Ashcraft & Gerel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 343 F.2d 333, 336 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
("[w]hat Congress did do in the 1959 amendments was simply to say that, if the employee
sued, the employer's compensation liability would be restricted to any excess of that liability
over the amount recorded. . ."). See also Albert v. Paulo, 552 F.2d 1139, 1141 n.3 (5th Cir.
1977); Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756, 763 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1053 (1976); Cella v. Partenreederei MS Ravenna, 529 F.2d 15, 19 (Ist Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975 (1976). See note 20 supra.
84. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
85. 382 A.2d at 274.
86. d
87. 521 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976).
88. The Second Circuit stated:
The appellant makes the practical argument that under . . . [the lower court's]
decision it will be more difficult for . . . [third parties] to settle . . . [employee]
cases, since there is no incentive on the. . . [employer] (or its carrier) to reduce its
compensation lien to help the settlement if it is not subject to the defense of concurrent negligence. That may be true in some cases, but it is only one consideration in
the whole congeries of relations involved and should be addressed to Congress.
521 F.2d at 763 n.10.
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Second Circuit did not specifically identify the considerations to which it
was alluding,8 9 it referred by implication to the following policies underlying the Act: protection of the employer rather than the third party; 9° reimbursement of the employer; 9' and protection of the employer's lien to
avoid inflationary increases in compensation insurance costs absent such
protection. 92 These policy considerations similarly apply in attempting to
force the employer into court for settlement pressure purposes. Therefore,
absent authority from Congress, courts should not impede protection of
the employer's lien interest by procedural or coercive measures.9 3
III.

THE

Jones DECISION

TravelersInsurance Co. v. Jones was based upon the same facts underlying the District of Columbia case. 94 In Jones, the District of Columbia
Superior Court considered the liability of the employee, the employee's
attorney, and the third party to Travelers. The court found that absent
intervention by Travelers in the third party suit by Jones against the District, neither Jones nor his attorney would be liable to Travelers for any
failure to reimburse Travelers for its workmen's compensation payments
to Jones. 95 Travelers also utilized Jones to bring a second action96 against
the District based upon the absence of Travelers' written consent to the
settlement between Mr. Jones and the District, as required by the Act. The
89. See 521 F.2d at 762.
90. See Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Wynn, 343 F.2d 295, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("The
See also text accompanying
statute is not designed to protect third parties from suit.).
note 80 supra.
91. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text.
92. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
93. Questions remain as to whether the District ofColumbia court, in dictum, was correct in requiring an employer otherwise to "assert affirmatively" its lien interest against the
third party absent a pending third party suit. 382 A.2d at 274. See text accompanying notes
55-58 supra. The same policies underscoring the inadvisability of requiring intervention
where a third party suit is pending apply. Absent the employer's express waiver of its interest, see Allen v. Texaco, Inc., 510 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1975), a third party, with notice of the
employer's interest, should be liable for failure to protect the employer's interest in light of
the underlying policies favoring the employer. See text accompanying notes 80-92 supra.
94. See text accompanying notes 32-42 supra. The Jones case was both a continuation
of Travelers' first suit against Jones after consolidation and a new suit filed against his attorney and against the District. The second suit against the District was by permission of the
court in dismissing the first action. See note 96 infra.
95. Record at 8-9, 18, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Jones, Nos. 227-76, 2357-76 (D.C. Super. Ct.
June 2, 1978).
96. In the first action against the District of Columbia, which led to the appellate decision in Travelers Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia, 382 A.2d 269 (D.C. 1978), the trial court
dismissed the action with leave to file a second suit based upon Travelers' "subrogation
rights" against the District. Record at 15.
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superior court held that Travelers had no such cause of action.97
In Jones, Travelers sought full reimbursement from Mr. Jones for the
$4,254.76 paid as compensation benefits to him.98 First, as to the $1,500 of
that amount, Travelers argued that its lien entitled it to reimbursement for
its prior payments out of the employee's third party recovery against the
District of Columbia.99 As to the remainder, Travelers contended that,
under the Act, it was liable for benefits to the employee for any excess over
a third party settlement only if its written consent to the settlement was
obtained."o Since such consent was not obtained, Travelers argued that
the employee was not entitled to the excess and must repay the benefits to
Travelers.
In opposition, Jones argued that District of Columbia required the employer or its carrier to intervene in the third party suit to assert its lien.
Since Travelers did not intervene, Jones contended it was not entitled to
recover any amount. Apparently relying solely on the Districtof Columbia
case, the court agreed with Mr. Jones' argument and granted his motion
for summary judgment. In an oral ruling from the bench, the court offered
no further rationale for its holding other than to state that District of Columbia required intervention for the employer or carrier to assert its recoupment interests against any party, not just third parties.' ° '
It is clear, however, that the superior court misinterpreted District of Columbia. The intervention required in that case referred only to enforcing
the lien against the proceeds in the third party's, and not the employee's,
possession. 10 2 In fact, the District of Columbia court specifically stated that
in situations when the employer or carrier does not intervene, the lien "is
97. Memorandum Order, Travelers Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia, No. 2357-76 (D.C.
Super. Ct. July 20, 1976).
98. For a discussion of the facts in Jones, see text accompanying notes 28-38 supra.
99. See note 24 supra.
100. 33 U.S.C. § 9 33 (g) (1976) provides:
If compromise with such third person is made by the person entitled to compensation or such representative of an amount less than the compensation to which such
person or representative would be entitled to under this chapter the employer shall
be liable for compensation . . .[in excess of the amount recovered against the third

party]

. . .

only if the written approval of such compromise is obtained from the

employer and its insurance carrier by the person entitled to compensation or such

representative at the time of or prior to such compromise on a form provided by
the Secretary and filed in the office of the deputy commissioner having jurisdiction
of such injury or death within thirty days after such compromise is made.
101. See Record at 8-9, 18, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Jones, Nos. 227-76, 2357-76 (D.C.
Super. Ct. June 2, 1978). The court made no distinction between the $1,500 and the excess

amount that Travelers sought.
102. 382 A.2d at 274; see text accompanying note 50 supra.
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placed on property in the hands of the employee."' 3 Further, legal precedent provides ample support for requiring reimbursement to the employer
from the employee without intervention." ° The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has explicitly held that "any
third party recovery which is less than the total amount of compensation
already paid, or to which the employee is entitled, inures to the benefit of
the employer and its insurance carrier. ' "5
Similarly, requiring repayment to the employer of the amount in excess
of the $1,500 settlement has a sound legal basis. As the District of Columbia Circuit stated in Ashcraft & Gerel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,"o6
the employer's compensation liability is restricted to any excess over the
amount received from the third party. The subsequent decision in Moraver
& Hartzell,Inc. v. Woodworth," °7 however, recognized that section 933(g)
requires the employer's and insurer's written consent to permit the recovery of the benefits described in Ashcraft. As the Supreme Court stated in
dismissing certiorari in Woodworth, "an employer is not obligated to pay
compensation to the employee" absent such consent.' 0 8 Therefore, contrary to the superior court's holding, Jones was liable to Travelers for the
entire amount paid to him. In light of the fact that Travelers was precluded by section 933(b) from bringing its own action against the District,
holding Jones liable for failure to obtain Travelers' consent seems only
equitable.
Likewise, the basis for the second suit against the District of Columbia
was premised upon the failure to obtain Travelers' written consent to the
settlement between Jones and the District as required by the Act."°9
Under similar facts, the Fourth Circuit held in Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Ameta & Co. 11 that, absent such written consent by the employer, a
release from the employee does not protect the third party from a recoup103. 382 A.2d at 274.
104. See notes 24, 56, 65, 67 supra.
105. Morauer & Hartzell, Inc. v. Woodworth, 439 F.2d 550, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 16 (1971). Again, this decision is controlling on the District of Columbia
courts because it was decided before February 1, 1971. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310,
312 (D.C. 1971).
106. 343 F.2d 333, 336 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
107. 439 F.2d 550, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
108. McClanahan v. Morauer & Hartzell, Inc., 404 U.S. 16 (1971). The Act's policy
favoring voluntary and prompt payment supports recoupment by the employer or carrier
where after receiving such payment the employee prejudices the employer's or carrier's recoupment interest by settling the third party claim without consent. See 382 A.2d at 273.
109. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
110. 564 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir. 1977).
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ment suit by the employer."' Such a holding comports with the intent of
the Act to protect the employer's recoupment interest'' 2 and to limit its
13
liability to only those benefits in excess of the third party recovery.'
Otherwise, the employer will obviously be doubly prejudiced if the employee settles with the third party for a small amount. Should this occur,
the employer's recoupment lien will attach to a smaller amount, forcing
the employer to pay more benefits.
In support of its reasoning, the superior court relied on case law since
repudiated by the court of appeals in Districtof Columbia, holding that the
Act does not permit a separate claim by the employer or its carrier against
the third party once the employee has filed suit against that party under
section 933(b)." 4 As the District of Columbia court concluded, however,
section 933(b) does not provide the sole remedy for an employer against a
third party in all cases." 15 Thus, the superior court erred in assuming the
carrier had no right of action against the District.
Finally, as to its action against Mr. Jones' attorney, Travelers did not
rely upon either its lien interest' 16 or the failure to obtain its written consent under the Act.' t 7 Instead, it asserted a simple breach of contract ac111. Id.at 1103.
112. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
113. See text accompanying notes 106-07 supra.
114. Memorandum Order at 3, Travelers Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia No. 2357-76
(D.C. Super. Ct. July 20, 1976). In reaching its decision, the superior court placed particular
reliance on the holding in Joyner v. F & B Enterprises, 448 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1971). This
decision was repudiated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. See note 45 supra.
In addition, the superior court held that Travelers had no cause of action due to its failure to
give notice to the District as required by D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-309 (1973). Memorandum
Order at 4.
115. For a discussion of the court's rationale, see text accompanying notes 43-55 supra.
116. In United States v. Limbs, 524 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1975), the Ninth Circuit considered the enforceability of the government's lien against the attorney for an injured government employee for reimbursement from proceeds of a third party settlement under the
Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1976) (the
equivalent of the Longshoremen's Act for federal employees). In declining to hold the attorney liable for conversion, the court noted that the FECA was amended in 1974 to impose a
lien on third party proceeds in the attorney's, or any other person's possession, for the benefit of the government. The court noted that "[tjhere is no indication that this amendment
attempted to codify existing law . . . [and] the negative implication of this amendment is
" Id. at 803. Interestingly, the District of
that an attorney previously had no such duty ..
Columbia Government Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act, Law 2-139 §§ 2301-2346, 25
D.C. Reg. 5936-99 (Supp. 1 1978), contains the exact same provision in favor of the District
of Columbia government. See note 74 supra. Since the existing Act and proposed Act of
1979 contain no similar provision, it is arguable that the private employer's lien, like the
federal government's lien before 1974, is not enforceable against an attorney, absent independent grounds such as breach of contract or fraud.
117. 33 U.S.C. § 933(g) (1976) specifically provides that the employer is not liable to an
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tion. Both before and after settlement, communications occurred between
Travelers' and Mr. Jones' attorney in which the attorney, according to
Travelers, acknowledged both Travelers' lien and the responsibility to protect it. Accordingly, Travelers argued that the attorney explicitly or impliedly agreed to protect its lien and breached that agreement by the
failure to do so." 8
As in the action against Mr. Jones, the lower court granted summary
judgment for the attorney, reasoning that District of Columbia required the
employer's intervention in the third party suit before holding any other
party liable for repayment of the third party proceeds." 9 Although Travelers argued that the District of Columbia decision concerned only the enforceability of the employer's lien against a third party and not the
contractual issues presented, the court, "out of an abundance of caution"
20
concerning the court of appeals' holding, dismissed the action.1
Nonetheless, District of Columbia only considered the limited issue of
the employer's lien and a third party, rather than any other issues concerning other parties such as the employee or the employee's attorney. In fact,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in an analogous case, Heffefinger v. Gibson,' 2' previously held that a doctor had an actionable claim for
breach of an implied contract by an attorney who failed to pay the doctor
first out of settlement proceeds for services rendered as agreed. In Heffelfinger, the attorney originally handling the case signed an agreement to
pay the doctor's fees for reports concerning his diagnosis and prognosis for
the attorney's injured client. The case was subsequently transferred to another attorney who was notified of the duty to pay the doctor first out of
any recovery. The doctor did not receive his fee from the recovery subsequently obtained. In sustaining the doctor's recovery against the original
attorney, the court noted that the subsequent acknowledgement to the second attorney concerning the duty to pay the doctor constituted an implied
employee for compensation in excess of a third party settlement unless its written consent is
obtained. Thus, absent such consent, the employer should be able to recover any excess
already paid from the employee. See text accompanying notes 106-08 supra. As to a third
party, such as the District, liability to the employer is premised upon the fact that a release
by a subrogor (the employee) does not release the third party from liability to the subrogee
(the employer absent the latter's knowledge or consent). See text accompanying notes 10913 supra. As to the attorney, absent fraud, a parallel theory of recovery does not appear to
exist. Cf note 116 supra.
118. Brief for Appellant at 18-22, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Jones, appeals docketed, Nos.
13660, 13661 (D.C. June 29, 1978).
119. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
120. Record, at 17-18, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Jones, Nos. 227-76, 2357-76 (D.C. Super. Ct.
June 2, 1978).
121. 290 A.2d 390 (D.C. 1972).
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promise to pay.' 22 Similarly, in United States v. Limbs, a federal district
court held that in the workmen's compensation context, an attorney may
be liable under proper circumstances for breach of an implied contract if
he fails to reimburse the employer.123 In Limbs, however, the court found
that a specific denial by the attorney during the third party suit prevented
24
any implied contract from arising.
Since the compensated employee is not entitled to the entire third party
recovery, 2- there is no real conflict of interest in requiring the attorney to
protect the employer's interest. In fact, recent decisions hold that the employee's attorney is entitled to a fee out of the employer's recoupment interest in the employee's third party recovery.' 26 Thus, the attorney is
arguably under a duty to protect the employer who is actually paying the
attorney a fee to do so. If no fee is taken, however, the existence of a duty
to pay remains uncertain, and the responsibility for payment will depend
upon the circumstances presented.
Thus, the superior court should have considered Travelers' claim against
the attorney. Under the the proper circumstances, an employee's attorney
should be responsible to protect the employer's lien interest. The failure of
the employer to intervene has no rational relationship to the contractual or
legal issues involved. Although the attorney argued in the superior court
that no such communications ever occurred, this merely created an issue of
material fact. In light of this, summary judgment was inappropriate. The
court's emphasis upon the District of Columbia decision, however, completely overshadowed the factual issues presented concerning the breach of
27
an implied contract.'
IV.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW IN THE DISTRICT UNDER THE

PROPOSED NEW ACT AND UNDER THE District of
AND Jones DECISIONS

Columbia

What then is the present state and foreseeable future of the law in the
District of Columbia with respect to the relative rights and duties of parties
actually or potentially involved in workmen's compensation cases? The
proposed District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act of 1979,128 as
122. Id at 394.
123. 356 F. Supp. 1004, 1015 (D. Ariz. 1973), aft'din relevantpart, 524 F.2d 799 (9th Cir.
1975).

124. 356 F. Supp. at 1012.
125. See notes 21 & 22 supra.
126. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Scheepvaart Maatschappij Trans-Ocean, 579 F.2d 1274 (5th
Cir. 1978); Valentino v. Richners Rhederei, G.M.B.H., SS Etha, 552 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1977).
127. See text accompanying notes 116-18 supra.
128. See proposed Bill 3-106, 25 D.C. Reg. 8524-89 (March 14, 1979).

19791

Workmen's Compensation Liens

presently worded, will have no effect upon the issues raised in the District
of Columbia and Jones cases. Unlike the present workmen's compensation acts for United States' 2 9 and District government employees 30 and
the no-fault provisions of the proposed Motor Vehicle Accident Victim
Protection Act of 1979, t3 l the private employer or insurer is not given any
more protection than it currently enjoys for its lien interest in third party
proceeds in the hands of other parties. The proposed compensation act
merely incorporates the language of the present Act's section 933 with respect to the relative rights and duties of the employer and employee. Thus,
it will not be likely to affect previous court interpretation and extrapolation
of section 933's provisions with regard to third parties' and attorneys' liability to the employer or insurer.
Clearly, under the District of Columbia decision, if the employer knows
of the pending third party action it must intervene to protect its right of
first payment from the third party. Other situations with regard to third
parties are not as clear. If the employer knows that the employee intends
to file suit against a third party or is presently engaged in settlement negotiations with a third party, then the safest procedure for the employer is to
notify the third party by registered letter of its lien and desire for reimbursement out of any settlement proceeds. Obviously, an employer cannot
formally intervene in a third party action until after a suit is filed. Therefore, the notification procedure outlined above would seem to comport
with the court of appeals' apparent requirement to "otherwise affirmatively
assert" the lien if no litigation is pending.' 3 2 If the employer does not
know of any pending or anticipated third party action or negotiation proceedings, again the most secure route is for the employer to notify by registered letter all potential third parties about whom it has any knowledge.
As to the employee's attorney, the employer again should request the
agreement of the attorney to protect its lien by registered letter. The attorney's agreement should be in writing. If, after the employer sends the let129. Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1976). In regard to
the relevant change in 1974 imposing the duty on attorneys and other persons to protect the
government's lien, see note 116 supra.

130. District of Columbia Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act of 1978, Law 2-139, §§
2301-2346, 25 D.C. Reg. 5936-99 (Supp. 1 1978) (effective March 3, 1979). For the text of§
2332 of the Act setting forth the liability of other persons to the employer in regard to its
lien, see note 74 supra.
131.

See Bill 3-36 § 9, 25 D.C. Reg. 6879 (Supp. 1 1979) (introduced January 11, 1979).

Under that section the insurer is to be reimbursed out of any third party recovery automatically by the injured insured, and by the third party with notice of the insurer's recoupment
interest.

132. See 382 A.2d at 274.
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ter to the attorney, the attorney refuses to respond or to agree, then the
employer has done all it can. The attorney, however, is arguably liable to
the employer if he fails to protect the lien since recent decisions state that
the attorney is entitled to a fee out of the employer's part of the third party
recovery. 33 If no fee is taken, the situation remains unclear and depends
upon the circumstances presented.
As to the employee, Jones contradicts overwhelming authority and will
no doubt be reversed on appeal. Even the District of Columbia decision
stated that the employer's lien is enforceable against the employee absent
intervention or other affirmative action by the employer. 134 Unless the
employer expressly waives its right of reimbursement, 135 the compensated
employee must be liable to the employer for failure to reimburse promptly
the employer's interest. The employee who is compensated receives all the
Act intends to provide. 136 To the extent the employee recovers more from
the third party than the employee received in compensation payments, the
employee rightfully retains that amount. In exchange for such equitable
treatment, however, the other beneficiary of the Act, the employer, must be
protected by imposing the duty to reimburse upon the employee even if the
employer does not intervene, or otherwise assert its lien. To require otherwise would make a sham of the compensation system.

133.
134.
135.
136.

See
See
See
See

note 126 supra.
text accompanying note 103 supra.
382 A.2d at 273-74 n.6; Allen v. Texaco, Inc., 510 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1975).
notes 22, 24 supra.

